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Abstract
Given an inconsistent, flat belief base, we show how to draw
non-trivial conclusions from it by selecting some of its maxi-
mal consistent subsets. This selection leads to inference rela-
tions with a stronger inferential power than the one based on
all maximal consistent subsets, without questioning the fact
that they are preferential relations (in the sense of KLM).
Introduction
Consider a scenario where a propositional, finite belief base
K is obtained by putting together in a common repository
some pieces of information, issued possibly from several
sources, and represented by propositional formulas. Sup-
pose also that the origins of the pieces of information (e.g.,
the sources they come from) are unknown or have been lost
(which is a common assumption underlying for instance the
AGM setting for belief revision, where it is supposed as
well that one cannot trace back the pieces of knowledge).
For the sake of illustration, suppose that the (contradictory)
pieces of information that were gathered concern an incom-
ing model of car from our favorite brand (those pieces of
information have been obtained through different sources,
including car magazines, websites, friends, etc.), Let K =
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕ6}, where the formulas in it state that the new car
has a 6-cylinder engine: ϕ1 = e6c, that it has a manual gear-
box: ϕ2 = mg, that it has a turbo (t) and that a car with a
6-cylinder engine is not a sport car: ϕ3 = t ∧ (e6c→ ¬sc),
that the car has a low fuel consumption (lc) and does not
have a manual gearbox: ϕ4 = lc∧¬mg, that it is a sport car
(sc), that does not have a manual gearbox and that a sport
car does not have a low fuel consumption, and that a car
with a 6-cylinder engine does not have 4-wheel drive (wd4):
ϕ5 = sc∧¬mg∧ (sc→ ¬lc)∧ (e6c→ ¬wd4), that the car
has 4-wheel drive, does not have a manual gearbox, and that
cars with 4-wheel drive do not have a low fuel consumption,
and that cars with a 6-cylinder engine do not need a turbo:
ϕ6 = wd4 ∧ ¬mg ∧ (wd4→ ¬lc) ∧ (e6c→ ¬t).
It can be easily checked that K has 5 maximal consis-
tent subsets, namely: K1 = {ϕ1, ϕ6}, K2 = {ϕ1, ϕ5},
K3 = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3}, K4 = {ϕ1, ϕ3, ϕ4}, K5 = {ϕ3, ϕ5, ϕ6}.
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Using skeptical inference from all these maximal consis-
tent subsets, none of the six formulas in K can be derived
as a conclusion. This means that for every formula ϕi (with
i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}), there exists a maximal consistent subset
Mj (j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}) of K such that Mj |= ¬ϕi. As a con-
sequence, only very weak conclusions composed of disjunc-
tions of those formulas can be obtained as consequences.
However, all the incoming pieces of information ϕi do not
play symmetric role with respect to the maximal consistent
subsets Mj . Consider for instance ϕ1 and ϕ2: we have that
ϕ1 is a logical consequence of 4 (over 5) maximal consistent
subsets of K, whileϕ2 is a logical consequence of only one of
them. Since the global inconsistency of a belief base is often
due to the presence in it of erroneous pieces of information,
it makes sense to take advantage of this discrepancy to con-
sider some pieces of information as more reliable than others
because they are more consensual / less conflicting with the
other pieces of information which have been reported.
Inference from
Selected Maximal Consistent Subsets
Our main objective is to identify selection criteria on maxi-
mal consistent subsets, leading to preserve more information
from the belief bases while guaranteeing that the induced
inference relations are preferential ones (Kraus, Lehmann,
and Magidor 1990). One already knows that such criteria
exist, since the inference relation based on the selection of
cardinality-maximal consistent subsets of K is preferential
(Benferhat et al. 1993), but we would like to identify other
inference schemas and more general conditions on the set
of all maximal consistent subsets which are sufficient to en-
sure that the corresponding inference relations are preferen-
tial ones.
To this end, we introduce new inference relations based
on a selection of the maximal consistent subsets of K maxi-
mizing a given scoring function. Let us note mc(K) the set of
all maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) consistent subsets of K.
Definition 1 (mcscore). Given a belief base K, a for-
mula α, and a real-valued mapping score, we de-
fine mcscore(K,α) = {Ki ∈ mc(K ∪ {α}) | α ∈
Ki and there exists no K′i ∈ mc(K ∪ {α}) such that α ∈
K′i and score(K
′
i) > score(Ki)}.
Definition 2 (Inference from selected subsets). Let K be
a belief base and α and β be two formulas. We say that
α |∼mcscoreK β if and only if either α is inconsistent, or for ev-
ery S ∈ mcscore(K,α) we have S |= β.
Here is a first inference relation of this family, based on
the number of maximal consistent sets a formula belongs to.
We say that a formula ϕ is trivial iff ϕ ≡ > or ϕ ≡ ⊥.
Definition 3 (score#mcK ). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K.
We define
score
#mc
K (α) =
{
0 if α is trivial
|{Ki ∈ mc(K) | α ∈ Ki}| otherwise
We also introduce the following definition:
Definition 4 (score#mcK,sum). Let K be a belief base, and let
Ki ⊆ K. We define
score
#mc
K,sum(Ki) =
∑
α∈Ki
score
#mc
K (α).
Applying this relation to the example reported in the
introduction, we obtain that the best maximal consis-
tent subsets of K are K3 and K4. Therefore, we get that
> |∼#mcK,sum e6c ∧ t ∧ ¬sc. Hence, we conclude that the car
has a 6-cylinder engine, a turbo, and is not a sport car.
Another valuable inference relation is obtained by consid-
ering the number of minimal inconsistent sets to define the
score of each formula.
Definition 5 (score#musK ). Let K be a belief base and
α ∈ K. Let us note mus(K) the set of all minimal (w.r.t. set
inclusion) inconsistent subsets of K. We define
score
#mus
K (α) =

0 if α is trivial, otherwise
1 + |mus(K)|−
|{Ki ⊆ K | Ki ∈ mus(K), α ∈ Ki}|
Yet another inference relation takes advantage of the in-
consistency value MIV (Hunter and Konieczny 2010):
Definition 6 (MIV). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K. We
define MIVK(α) =
∑
M∈mus(K),α∈M
1
|M | .
Definition 7 (score#mivK ). Let K be a belief base and α ∈ K.
We define maxmiv(K) = maxα∈KMIVK(α), and
score
#miv
K (α) =
{
0 if α is trivial, otherwise
1 + maxmiv(K)− MIVK(α)
Note that though the three scoring functions above lead to
select the same maximal consistent subsets for the running
example, this is not the case in general.
Properties
Let us now show that the three inference relations defined
above, and other ones based on the same construction, have
desirable logical properties. In the following, the set of posi-
tive integers is denoted by N and the set of non-negative real
numbers by R≥0.
Definition 8 (scoreK). Given a belief base K, scoreK : K→
R≥0 is a scoring function if scoreK(α) = 0 if and only if α
is a trivial formula.
We now need to compare sets of formulas based on scores
of individual formulas. This calls for aggregation functions.
Definition 9 (Aggregation function). We say that⊕ is an ag-
gregation function if for every n ∈ N, for every x1, . . . , xn ∈
R≥0 ⊕(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R≥0.
Definition 10 (Properties of aggregation functions). Let ~x
be a shortcut for x1, . . . , xn. An aggregation function⊕ sat-
isfies
• Composition if ⊕(~x) ≤ (~y) implies ⊕(~x, z) ≤ (~y, z)
• Decomposition if ⊕(~x, z) ≤ (~y, z) implies ⊕(~x) ≤ (~y)
• Symmetry if for every permutation σ, ⊕(~x) = ⊕(σ(~x))
• Monotonicity if for every z > 0 we have ⊕(~x, z) > ⊕(~x)
As an example of aggregation function satisfying all the
above properties, consider sum, which returns the sum of all
scores. Composition, Decomposition and Symmetry were
introduced in (Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis 2004). We add
here a new property, namely Monotonicity.
From a scoring function and an aggregation function, a
relation for comparing the subsets of K can be easily defined:
Definition 11 (scoreK,⊕). Let K be a belief base and Ki =
{α1, . . . , αn} a subset of K. Let scoreK be a scoring func-
tion and ⊕ an aggregation operator. We define
scoreK,⊕(Ki) = ⊕(scoreK(α1), . . . , scoreK(αn)).
Proposition 1. Let K be a belief base, ⊕ an aggregation
operator satisfying Composition, Decomposition, Symmetry
and Monotonicity and let scoreK be any scoring function.
Then |∼mcscoreK,⊕K is a preferential relation.
Conclusion
In this paper we have pointed out new inference relations
based on the selection of maximal consistent subsets of a
belief base. By construction, those inference relations have a
stronger inferential power than the one based on all maximal
consistent subsets, but they are still preferential ones. We
are currently looking for a more general characterization of
the selection functions to be considered for ensuring that the
induced inference relations are preferential ones.
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